I. Introduction
T he persistence of high unemployment in Europe continues to be a major concern of theoretical and empirical macroeconomics [Drrze and Bean, 1990 b] . In particular, the challenge is to explain why both reasonable demand growth and various favourable supply-side developments failed to bring down unemployment decisively in the 1980s. When unemployment rates first shot up and refused to return to earlier low levels in the 1970s, a consensus on the causes of the problem formed more easily. Adverse supply shocks and explosive wage growth were the essential elements of the mainstream explanation, which heavily relied on two key concepts: the NAIRU, a measure of the unemployment rate consistent with non-accelerating inflation, and the real wage gap, a measure of the amount by which real wages supposedly exceed their equilibrium level. The collision between the soaring wage aspirations of workers and the diminished potential for real income growth pushed up both of these measures [Bruno and Sachs, 1985] .
In the 1980s, it became increasingly difficult to explain still higher unemployment rates along the same lines. At first, the blame for the worsening employment picture could be put on the severe demand contraction of 1980-82, which added a layer of Keynesian unemployment to the inherited level of classical unemployment [Bruno, 1986] .
Remark: We acknowledge valuable comments on earlier drafts of this paper from participants at the May 1991 IEA conference "Open Economy Macroeconomics" in Vienna and at research seminars at the Universities of Hamburg and Munich. In particular, we thank S. Felder, F.X. Hof and E. Rysavy for pointing out an error in the specification of a preliminary version of our model. However, as high unemployment persisted beyond 1982 in the face of recovering demand growth, the Keynesian explanation clearly lost appeal. But so did the classical unemployment hypothesis as real wages grew moderately at rates well below productivity growth year after year.
The coincidence of rising unemployment with what appears to be wage moderation prompts us to take another look at the concept of the real wage gap. Earlier authors such as Schultze [1987] have pointed out that changes in the profit maximizing mix of factor inputs cast doubt on the validity of conventional measures of the real wage gap as an indicator of an excessive real wage level and hence of labour market disequilibrium. In this paper, we take the argument one step further by offering a fully specified dynamic model which endogenizes the choice of factor inputs by firms and thus makes transparent how different shocks affect output, employment, investment, wages and factor shares in different ways. The model pays particular attention to the role that capital accumulation has to play in an explanation of labour market developments, thus taking up a theme emphasized by Fitoussi and Phelps [1988] in their account of the European unemployment conundrum.
The empirical sections of our paper look at the experience of Germany, confronting the predictions of the model with the most salient features of macroeconomic performance since 1970. The key relationships of the model are estimated with German data for the period 1961-91. The main indicators that will concern us in the subsequent analysis are compiled in Table 1 and Figure 1 . The figure charts the evolution of our own measure of the real wage gap (as estimated below) along with the unemployment rate. Evidently, the two variables moved in opposite directions for the most part of the 1980s. The table summarizes some other distinct trends: the slowdown in the average growth of labour productivity and real wages, the slowdown in the pace of capital accumulation as reflected both in the growth rate of the capital stock and in the investment ratio, and the marked rise of the real interest rate after 1980.1 We now proceed as follows: In Section II, we discuss some conceptual issues relating to the real wage gap and present our own estimate.
